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The paper reviews the alternatives available to Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) to 
finance investment required to mitigate and adapt to climate change. It also takes into 
account the financial needs to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
Since the requirements dwarfs the financial capabilities of the public sector in EMEs, 
the paper explores possible funding channels focusing on international financial 
markets. The paper identifies potential obstacles to a smooth and sustainable finance 
provision, including the influence of the global financial cycle on credit supply, risks 
related to currency mismatch and creditworthiness assessment, and mispricing of risks. 
The review also identifies the challenges to the exporting profile and therefore the 
sustainability of the balance of payments of EMEs. Finally, the paper provides some 
reflections on the limits of domestic private capital markets to bridge the 
“environmental financial gap”, and calls for the deeper involvement of specialized and 




Keywords: Climate Change, Sustainable Development Goals, Financial requirements, 
international capital markets, green bonds, sustainable finance 
JEL Classification: E44, F64, G23, O13, Q58 
 
We are grateful for the comments and suggestions of Yannis Dafermos, Daniela Gabor, 
Annina Kaltenbrunner, Maria Nikolaidi and Servaas Storm. We also acknowledge the 
financial support of Higher Education Links Grant of the British Council. All errors and 
mistakes are our own responsibility. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Climate Change (CC) has been defined as an existential threat to human life. 
Though it is difficult to make forecasts, there is consensus that the effects of CC will 
have substantial impact on standards of living and productive capacity. The IPCC 
(2018: 264) states that “The mean net present value of the costs of damages from 
warming in 2100 for 1.5°C and. 2°C (including costs associated with climate change-
induced market and non-market impacts, impacts due to sea level rise, and impacts 
associated with large-scale discontinuities) are $54 and $69 trillion, respectively, 
relative to 1961–1990”. Fighting, mitigating and adapting to these challenges require 
substantial amounts of investment. Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) face a double 
task in this regard. The economic impact of CC will be stronger in warmer countries, of 
which the majority is either an EME or a low-income country (IMF 2017). Furthermore, 
on top of (and to some extent, overlapping with) climate-change related investment 
(CCRI), EMEs face the task of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
which also requires important investment. This has risen questions about the capabilities 
to mobilize resources and funding, given the limited domestic capital and financial 
market that characterizes EMEs (with some notable exceptions).  
The question comes about alternative and new funding channels for these 
challenges, and the dangers these channels may imply. International multilateral 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are encouraging the 
recourse to international capital markets by EMEs as a way to overcome the financing 
constrains in these economies. New developments in sustainable finance are an 
encouraging sign, but integration into international financial markets is not devoid of 
challenges and dangers. The influence of the Global Financial Cycle (GFC) may impede 
the flow of capital in reasonable terms as required by EMEs. 
Furthermore, CC can also have an impact on the productive and trading profile 
of EMEs, via both physical and transition risks. The specialization in carbon-intensive 
production such as energy and fossil fuels, risks on agricultural production (such as 
more frequent draughts, floods and temperature change) and disruption of Global 
Production Networks (GPNs) rise warnings about the sustainability of the Balance of 
Payments (BP) of developing countries, in addition to the challenges originated in the 
integration to international financial markets as a mean to finance CC-related 
investment.   
Though much has been written about the opportunities and developments in the 
sustainable finance field for EMEs, there is scant literature on the open economy 
dimension of the challenges and difficulties faces by EMEs. On a theoretical 
perspective, the paper closer to our subject is Carnevali et al (2019). We broaden their 
analysis by examining how current financing alternatives enhance but at the same time 
endanger the financial capabilities of EMEs to achieve the investment levels and 
composition required to cope with climate change and the SDGs. The paper is 
structured as follows. Section II will revise the financial needs for CC and SDGs as 
estimated by different international bodies. It will also review the literature on the 
development of new alternatives in the field of sustainable finance with a particular 
focus on EMEs. Section III puts the focus on international funding channels and the 
dangers of international financial integration dedicated to CC-related investment. 
Section IV reflects on the risks and opportunities CC poses for the trade profiles of 
EMEs. Section V looks at the repercussion on EMEs domestic financial systems.  
 
II. INVESTMENT NEEDS, DISBURSEMENTS AND 
INSTRUMENTS 
Given the uncertain bases on which to estimate the investment required to fight, 
mitigate and adapt to the different scenarios envisioned by climate change, there are 
multiple estimations on how much is needed, depending on the projected increase in 
temperature and the investment gaps that keep accumulating. In 2013, the World 
Economic Forum estimated USD 5.7 trillion investment per year until 2030 to secure 
future growth in a 2°C degrees higher scenario. The New Climate Economy Report 
(GCEC 2014) estimated USD 90 trillion in fifteen years, or around USD 6 trillion per 
year. The OECD (2017: 28) increased those estimation to USD 6.9 trillion until 2030 to 
provide for a climate-resilient, low-carbon economy consistent with a 2°C degrees 
higher scenario (with 66% of probability).  In its 2018 1.5° Report, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change stats that “1.5°C-consistent climate 
policies would require a marked upscaling of energy system supply-side investments 
(resource extraction, power generation, fuel conversion, pipelines/transmission, and 
energy storage) between now and mid-century, reaching levels of between USD 1.6–3.8 
trillion globally on average over the 2016–2050 time frame” (IPCC 2018: 154, italics 
our own). It should be noted that actual investment trends, only considering energy 
supply-side investment, fall short of the requirements by an estimated USD 0.9 trillion 
per year. 
Investment for climate-change mitigation and adaptation is not delinked, 
however, from the commitments required to achieve the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), within the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In 
fact, the SDG 13 refers explicitly to the urgency to address climate change. IPCC 
(2018) states that climate change has non-neutral effects on poverty and income 
distribution. The UN estimated USD 5-7 trillion globally per year to achieve the SDGs 
(UN 2015, UNEP 2016, 2018). Estimated needs for developing Asia reach USD 200 
billion per year (Sachs et al 2019), while Latin America needs to invest USD 175 billion 
considering only mitigation and adaptation expenditures related to climate change 
(Abramskkiehn et al 2017: 2). 
The OECD, the World Bank and other multilateral institutions (OECD 2019, 
WB 2018) claim that the magnitude of funding required is far superior to the financial 
capabilities of the public sector, and it also dwarfs the resources of development banks. 
In addition, the introduction of Basel III regulations discourages the lending by banks to 
enterprises and activities with little to no prior record on which to assess riskiness. Also 
financial stability concerns are raised against prioritizing bank credit as a finance 
channel. Therefore, these institutions encourage the tapping of private financial markets 
as a mean to fund climate-change related, “green” investment. And ever since the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) issued the first labelled “green bond” in 2007 there 
have been developments in the field of “green finance”, not devoid of fluctuations and 
volatility.  
Gross green bond issuance in 2018 barely increased over 2017 figures, reaching 
USD 167.6 billion compared to USD 162.1 billion the year before (CBI 2019a). The US 
and China are the market dominants in terms of amounts issued, and Asia-Pacific is the 
region that experienced the greater growth rate in terms of issuances, dominating 
developing countries’ green bond markets. Issuance by Latin American countries 
stagnated, as well as by African economies. As for the currency of denomination (a 
major topic to be developed below), the euro, the US dollar and the Chinese RMB 
concentrate 84% of gross issuance. However, there have been deals in 30 currencies. 
When looking at climate finance flows for new projects, in 2018 figures fell 
short of 2017 levels (CPI 2019), falling from USD 612 billion to USD 564 billion. Data 
by CPI is not necessarily compatible with green bond issuance data, because the 
proceeds of the latter are not always devoted to new primary investment (repeated 
issuers captured 63% of the volume green bonds issued), while the quality of reporting 
needs improvement (CPI 2019, p. 15). With those caveats, the average of climate flows 
for the years 2017 and 2018 shows that private financing sources indeed represent 56% 
of the funding, and market-rate debt comprising 54% of the instruments. Public finance 
is also mainly conducted through Development Financial Institutions (DFIs). Most of 
the funding indeed is directed towards the domestic economy (75%, according to CPI 
2019). In terms of destinations, developing countries received 61% of the financing for 
new investment projects, with East Asia taking 41% of all climate finance flows (CPI 
2019, p. 24). Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the MENA countries and South Asia 
received each less than 5% of the flows, in the average of 2017/2018. Of international 
flows, on average between 2017 and 2018 77% of the flows went from OECD to non-
OECD countries, increasing 60% in absolute terms versus the average of the two 
previous years. 
Issuance of green bonds recovered substantially in 2019 (CBI2019b). The 
volatility of the green bond market, when taken into consideration as well the stagnation 
in 2018, reveals one of the vulnerabilities of climate-related investment: its exposure to 
global financial conditions, independently of the awareness about the urgency of such 
type of investment. The tightening of financial markets in 2018 provides a warning 
about the reliance in private funding for such purposes. The restrictions are not limited 
to bond markets: supranational entities and DFIs also funded substantial shares of their 
long-term investment in the bond market, and are therefore affected by spillovers. Green 
bonds yields suffer from greater volatility than conventional bonds, though rates of 
return are somewhat below the average of the market (Ehlers and Packer 2017). 
Furthermore, evidence on green loans on China show that non-performing loan (NPL) 
ratios are below the average (NGFS 2019). The demand for financing conditions seems 
to be resilient and does not compare unfavorably to conventional credit demand. 
Developments in credit supply lag behind in terms of stability, access and risk. 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
As mentioned before, 75% of the funds for new projects is directed towards the 
domestic economy (CPI 2019). However, the gap with the investment needs surveyed in 
the previous section called for an engagement with external sources of funding. This 
call is compounded by the relatively smaller size of financial markets in most EMEs. 
An additional constraint is the global turn towards market-based funding rather than 
bank-based. EMEs financial systems are generally oriented precisely towards bank-
based finance. Basel III rules discriminate against loans considered “risky”, and the 
field of renewable energy fits that criteria. This does not imply that there have been no 
advances in the sphere of “green loans” in EMEs. Standards for green loans were 
established in Asian and Latin American countries, a useful step for the development of 
that market. But the orientation fostered by multilateral organizations is towards the 
integration of international capital markets in the provision of funds for climate-change 
related investment. 
However, this integration is not devoid of risks and costs. Some of these are not 
exclusively related to “green finance”. The rhythm and pace of financial flows responds 
to the monetary and financial conditions in advanced markets (notably, the US) more 
than the state of “fundamentals” recipient countries. In this sense, the supply of finance 
for climate-related projects is tied to the evolution of the Global Financial Cycle (Rey 
2013). The gaps in funding cumulate at an exponential rate. The damage is larger 
because of specific characteristics of renewable energy projects (Ghisetti et al 2017, 
NRDC 2016). 
The fact that the green bond market is mainly denominated in “hard” currencies 
is also a well-known factor of risk for EMEs as it creates a currency-mismatch problem, 
particularly is the benefited projects do not lead to an improvement in the current 
account balance. This danger is not merely restricted to fully market-based finance. The 
involvement of National Development Banks (NDBs) and other types of public finance 
under the strategy of blended finance, as sponsored by the OECD for instance (OECD 
2019), also relies on the NDBs and the public sector to take over risks that the private 
sector refuses to take, thus carrying in its balance-sheet a possible currency mismatch, 
among other burdens. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) also present a potential 
currency and fiscal burden for the public sector (Gabor 2020). However, the 
involvement of NDBs, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and other financial 
institutions has advantages that will be mentioned further below. 
Mispricing of risk and credit rationing or misallocation is further compounded 
by the identification of environmentally-sustainable projects, the eventual destination of 
the funding. One of the most disseminated criteria for assessing investment is the 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) classification. It is estimated that by 2021 
ESGs assets will represent around two-thirds of the portfolio of global funds (Nelson 
2018, Gabor et al 2019). The certification of green bonds is carried by an increasing 
number of rating agencies, public and private (Ehlers and Packer 2017). The rating of 
these bonds and generally ESGs assets is not highly correlated across different agencies 
for the same projects. In this sense, ESG-label has turned into a speculative valuation 
practice (Leins 2020), creating risks for “greenwashing”. This creates another channel 
for mispricing of climate-related risks and misallocation of investment. Capital market 
lending for EMEs projects is not excluded from this risk. 
This feature is a particular manifestation of a more general theme: the type of 
investor matters for the type of project to be financed, and the general direction of 
innovation, for instance in renewable energy (Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2018). 
Environmental innovation has additional risks compared to traditional innovation, like 
longer maturity, capital intensity, lock-in effects and path dependency (Aghion et al 
2014), so that financial restrictions and misallocations can have a lasting impact 
(Ghisetti et al 2017). Different actors have different portfolios in terms of technologies 
and risk. The involvement of MDBs also helps to improve the access to credit for riskier 
debtors and provide a signaling function (Gurara et al 2020). Public investment seems 
to favor riskier technologies and a larger share of investment (Mazzucato and 
Semieniuk 2018). Private actors tend to fund low-risk technologies. Different 
investments and innovations will affect the productive and trading pattern of EMEs. 
 
IV. TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Climate change may affect the balance-of-payments of EMEs also through the 
balance of trade, not merely through the financial account. Dellink et al (2017) use a 
DSGE model developed by the OECD to provide a qualitative and regional assessment 
of the direct and indirect effects of climate change on trade. 
Because of its reliance in sectors with a high level of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission such as transport, trade may be detrimental to achieving the 1.5ªC goal. 
However, the global trade-to-GDP ratio has stagnated in the 2010s, and it is not certain 
that this relation would rise in the near future. On this account alone, one could say that 
greenhouse gases (GHG) emission would follow GDP growth trend. However, changes 
in the composition of global growth may affect the relation between global activity and 
GHG emissions. While advanced economies seek to decouple economic activity from 
GHG emission, growth may pick up in countries with less environmental efficiency.  
These arguments are related to the impact of trade on GHG emissions. These 
section deals, however, with the opposite influence. In this regard, Dellink et al (2017) 
distinguish between direct effects of climate change in terms of physical destruction and 
transformation, and indirect effects in terms of changes in policies, prices and factors. 
Direct effects include more recurrent storms, sea level rise (expected from 3 to 6 ft by 
the end of the century, with great variety by region)1, deterioration of infrastructure such 
as roads due to more solar radiation and extreme temperatures, and other factors. These 
impacts will affect air, land, river and sea-based transport. The impact on inland river-
based transport system (either through lower depth levels, or through floods and rising 
water levels in delta and port areas) will increase transportation costs, production 
networks and grain transport, among other effects (Curtis 2009). The melting of the 
Arctic Sea, however, would reduce time and transport costs by opening new routes and 
redirecting existing ones. On the other side, this may lead to a further concentration of 
trade between advanced Northern economies at the disadvantage of developing 
countries, but also Southern and Eastern European countries. An obvious remark goes 
to the severe impact of increased trade in the Arctic ecosystem.  
On the indirect effects front, global warming will have an asymmetric impact in 
different regions. In tropical countries, temperature will increase leading to lower 
productivity. Heat, drought and floods will have an impact on agricultural production 
affecting mainly developing countries. Oil-producing countries will experience a fall in 
price and demand, if the transition to renewable energy sources is more widespread. 
Regulatory policies like banning fossil-fueled cars and discouraging short-flights (and 
favouring train transportation) will also drive down oil demand. On the other hand, 




productivity. Crops such as wheat will suffer less favourable conditions in most of the 
world, but will increase its productivity in Northern America and Europe. In sum, the 
expectation is that EMEs and Least-Developed Countries with a primary producing 
based and export profile will experience a deterioration in their balance-of-trade. The 
opposite is expected to happen to Northern, developed economies. There is of course a 
high degree of uncertainty in these projections. Regulatory policies and feedback effects 
will influence the dynamics of the adjustments. Copyright and patent issues, and lock-in 
effects may deter the access of EMEs (and low-income economies) to new, 
environmentally-efficient technology (Brown et al 2008).  
To muddle through these changes EMEs will need to redefine their productive 
profile. As reviewed in the previous section, international finance currently falls short of 
the needs, and also in quality terms. The next section will give a brief outlook to the 
capabilities of domestic financial systems in EMEs to face this task. 
 
V. DOMESTIC CLIMATE FINANCE IN EMEs: A BRIEF 
REVIEW 
Domestic financial markets in EMEs are predominantly bank-based, and with a lower 
level of development and deepness than in advanced economies. However, in the last 
decade corporate indebtedness in EMEs increased substantially (Coppola et al 2020). 
And as we mentioned before, the largest part of climate finance for new projects (75 per 
cent) came from domestic sources. In sum, domestic credit increased substantially in 
EMEs, though two caveats apply. First, the growth in domestic finance is particularly 
attributed to China and a few more Asian economies. Second, this growth in credit 
slowed down in the second half of the 2010s, and did not reached levels of credit and 
developments in financial markets comparable to advanced economies. 
On top of having less liquid and developed financial systems, EMEs face further 
obstacles in their capabilities to finance climate-change related investment. The issue of 
stranded assets weights heavily in EMEs. Oil companies in oil-producing countries have 
a strong relation and account for a large share of bank assets. Movements to decrease 
the production of fossil-fuels may lead to a deterioration in their market value, lower 
their financial capabilities and financial demands, and reduce bank profitability. All at 
the same time that they need to reorient credit to new sectors, accompanying changes in 
the productive structure. This effort may lead to deteriorated capitalization with an 
expanded asset side, increasing financial instability. The public sector has a key role to 
play in the mitigation of financial risks, with public banks, development banks and 
specialized banks. 
Credit in developing countries also tend to move together with the Global Financial 
Cycle. Easing credit conditions in international markets translate into higher access by 
EMEs firms, including banks. Another channel operates through domestic 
affiliates/subsidiaries of foreign banks. With large requirements of imported content in 
energy-related investment (particularly in the energy sector), there are risks of growing 
currency mismatches both in the productive and in the domestic financial sector. 
Furthermore, domestic finance is not isolated from the GFC. Funding may dry both in 
the international and domestic market, via rising spreads, exchange rate depreciations 
and credit tightening.  
Just like in the international sphere the role of multilateral bodies, official entities, and 
development agencies must be increased, a similar need arises in EMEs. Public 
institutions, specialized banks and development banks will need to step up lending 
facilities with relative independence of market fluctuations in order to assure a steady 
and reliable flow of finance to a new and growing sector, until the private banking and 
financial sector finds it profitable and less risky to expand credit to them. 
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